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CONTEXTUALIZING THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
Adam Lamparello*
Abstract
The level of protection afforded to an individual’s First Amendment
right to freely exercise religion should depend upon the context within
which it is exercised. Put differently, an individual’s right to religious
liberty should be balanced against other individuals’ right to equal
protection of the law, and the broader societal interest in protecting
individuals from invidious discrimination. This Article proposes a multifactor test that fully protects the right to freely exercise one’s religion
while simultaneously safeguarding equal protection and antidiscrimination guarantees. Specifically, the level of protection afforded
to a free exercise claim should depend, among other things, on whether it
occurs in the private or public sphere (e.g., in a house of worship or a
business that provides goods or services to the general public), whether
an individual asserting such a claim is acting on behalf of a governmental
entity, and whether the protection of religious freedom would infringe on
equal protection and anti-discrimination principles. Such a test is
consistent with the text and original purpose underlying the Free Exercise
Cause and with the guarantee of equal protection and liberty for all
citizens.
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INTRODUCTION
“[T]he character of every act depends upon the circumstances in
which it is done.”1

1. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (emphasis added) (citing Aikens v.
Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194 (1904)).
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When Kim Davis defied the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in
Obergefell v. Hodges2 and refused to issue marriage licenses to same-sex
couples, some claimed that Davis’s brief stint in a Kentucky jail after
defying a district court’s order to issue such licenses trampled on
religious liberty.3 After her release, Davis stood outside of a Kentucky
courthouse with her arms raised toward the sky, brimming with the type
of jubilation that typically occurs when some flamboyant televangelist
miraculously “cures” a wheelchair-bound audience member simply by
touching the person’s forehead.4 Some onlookers cheered for Davis, who
claimed that she was acting “[u]nder God’s authority.”5
Not long before the Kim Davis fiasco, another bizarre episode
occurred in neighboring and ultra-right-wing Indiana, which at the time
was rightfully the laughingstock of the country after enacting a religious
freedom law that was little more than a veiled license to discriminate
against same-sex couples.6 Indiana’s “uncommonly silly”7 law caused
three states to ban state-funded travel to the state of Indiana, making
Indiana appear to some outsiders as the West’s version of ISIS.8 Months
after that debacle, the owners of an Indiana bakery, Melissa and Aaron

2. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
3. See, e.g., Ryan T. Anderson, We Don’t Need Kim Davis to Be in Jail, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/07/opinion/we-dont-need-kim-davis-to-be-in-jail.
html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=opinion-c-col-right-region&region= opinion-ccol-right-region&WT.nav=opinion-c-col-right-region&_r=1; Greg Botelho & Dominique
Debucquoy-Dodley, Kim Davis’ Lawyers File New Appeal over Same-Sex Marriage License
Order, CNN (Nov. 4, 2015, 2:51 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/04/us/kim-davis-kentuckyappeal/ (“While Davis is lampooned by critics calling her a hypocrite who doesn’t respect U.S.
law, many supporters praise her for standing up to the courts and the powers-that-be.”).
4. Amanda Terkel, Kim Davis Released from Jail Before Defiant Crowd, HUFFINGTON
POST (Sept. 8, 2015, 3:28 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/kim-davis-jailhuckabee_us_55ef258be4b093be51bc5dcc.
5. Jack Jenkins, The Religious Beliefs of Kim Davis, The Anti-Gay Clerk Who Refuses to
Do Her Job, Explained, THINKPROGRESS (Sept. 2, 2015), http://thinkprogress.org/lgbt/2015/
09/02/3698100/kim-davis-hypocritical-theology/.
6. See Cara Anthony, Thousands Protest ‘Religious Freedom’ Law in Indiana, USA
TODAY (Mar. 28, 2015, 11:29 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/
03/28/thousands-protest-religious-freedom-law-indy/70596032/.
7. Similarly, Justice Potter Stewart found Connecticut’s law forbidding the use of
contraceptives by anyone to be “an uncommonly silly law.” Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 527 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
8. See Josh Feldman, Washington Gov. Also Bans State-Funded Travel to Indiana,
MEDIAITE (Mar. 30, 2015, 8:53 PM), http://www.mediaite.com/online/washington-gov-alsobans-state-funded-travel-to-indiana/; Erica Orden, Cuomo Bans New York State-Funded Travel
to Indiana, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 31, 2015, 8:48 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/new-yorkscuomo-bans-state-funded-travel-to-indiana-1427849308; Ben Rooney, Connecticut Bans StateFunded Travel to Indiana over Anti-Gay Law, CNN: MONEY (Mar. 31, 2015, 9:54 AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2015/03/30/news/indiana-religious-freedom-law/.
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Klein, refused to bake a cake for a same-sex couple,9 believing that doing
so would be a commitment to sin.10 Imagine if a business owner claimed
that serving African-Americans, Hispanics, the disabled, or that woman
in the wheelchair (who, it turns out, was never healed after all) was also
a commitment to sin.11
That, in a nutshell, is the point—and the problem.
If the courts exempted individuals’ conduct, such as Kim Davis’s and
the Indiana bakers’, from generally applicable laws that do not
substantially burden their religious liberty, some citizens would be
permitted to exercise constitutional freedoms by infringing on an entire
group’s ability to invoke basic constitutional protections. That is a
prescription for unequal protection of the law—and unequal liberty for
all.
Fortunately, Kim Davis is now issuing marriage licenses, although
Kentucky’s legislature has changed the law to ensure that Davis does not
have to put her name on these licenses.12 The Indiana bakery is now
closed.13 Now Melissa and Aaron Klein can have their cakes—and eat
9. See Aviva Shen, This Bakery Refused to Serve a Same-Sex Couple and It May Cost
Them $135,000, THINKPROGRESS (Apr. 25, 2015), http://thinkprogress.org/lgbt/2015/04/25/
3651276/sweet-cakes-settlement-order/.
10. Another Indiana bakery received criticism for refusing to make a cake for a gay couple’s
commitment ceremony. See, e.g., Billy Hallowell, Bakery That Ignited Controversy with Refusal
to Bake Gay Wedding Cake Closes Up Shop: ‘We Were Just Trying to Be Right with Our God,’
BLAZE (Mar. 2, 2015, 8:21 AM), http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2015/03/02/bakery-thatignited-controversy-with-refusal-to-bake-gay-wedding-cake-closes-up-shop-we-were-just-trying
-to-be-right-with-our-god/ (“As attendees of a Baptist church, the McGaths . . . explained they
didn’t want to be a part of the commitment ceremony, as they believed it reflected a ‘commitment
to sin . . . .’”).
11. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2805 (2014) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). Justice Ginsburg stated as follows:
Would the exemption the Court holds RFRA demands for employers with
religiously grounded objections to the use of certain contraceptives extend to
employers with religiously grounded objections to blood transfusions (Jehovah’s
Witnesses); antidepressants (Scientologists); medications derived from pigs,
including anesthesia, intravenous fluids, and pills coated with gelatin (certain
Muslims, Jews, and Hindus); and vaccinations (Christian Scientists, among
others)?
Id.; see David J. Stewart, Benny Hinn Is a Fake, JESUS IS SAVIOR, http://www.jesus-issavior.com/Wolves/benny_hinn-fake.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2016) (“Another woman in a
wheel-chair was wheeled up to the platform, allegedly crippled from diabetes, then she walked on
stage. . . . Again, I ask, why doesn’t Hinn ever use his alleged power to heal the sick people in
hospitals? The reason is abundantly clear . . . Hinn is a fraud.”).
12. Associated Press, Kentucky Bows to Clerk Kim Davis and Changes Marriage License
Rules, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2015, 10:41 AM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-nann-kentucky-kim-davis-20151223-story.html.
13. Sophia June, Anti-Gay Gresham Bakery Sweet Cakes by Melissa Finally Closes,
WILLAMETTE WEEK (Oct. 6, 2016), http://www.wweek.com/news/2016/10/06/anti-gay-gresham-
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them too. As they say, God works in mysterious ways.
***
The above examples underscore one of the biggest controversies in
American constitutional law today. To what extent should the right to
freely exercise one’s religion require federal and state legislatures to
grant citizens exemptions from laws that neither target nor discriminate
against religion? This Article answers that question and proposes a
solution that is rooted in the negative right to equal liberty under the law,
that contextualizes the free exercise of religion, and that considers the
deleterious effects of certain religious liberty claims on the constitutional
rights of those adversely affected by their exercise.
The text and purposes of the free exercise clause support such a
framework.14 The Founders drafted the free exercise clause to prohibit
the government from substantially interfering with religious liberty, such
as through laws that coerce individuals into violating their religious
beliefs, target specific religions or religious practices, or question the
sincerity of an individual’s religious beliefs.15 However, the Founders did
not envision that the government was required to grant citizens
exemptions from generally applicable laws.16 The proposed standard in
this Article furthers the original purposes of the free exercise clause and
safeguards citizens from unequal protection of the law.
As discussed in Part IV, four factors should guide the Court when
evaluating whether a law substantially burdens an individual’s religious
liberty and whether a countervailing state interest is sufficiently
compelling.17 First, the Court must consider the role of the individual
who seeks protection under the blanket of religious liberty. For example,
is the individual a pastor in a private church or a clerk in the county
courthouse? Second, the Court should consider the place in which the
right is exercised. Is the individual seeking to exercise this right in a
church or synagogue, or in a classroom or a courthouse? Third, the Court
should consider the effects on third parties of exercising religion,
bakery-sweet-cakes-by-melissa-finally-closes/.
14. E.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547
(1993) (“Legislators may not devise mechanisms, overt or disguised, designed to persecute or
oppress a religion or its practices.”); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (stating that
“[i]f the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all religions or is to
discriminate invidiously between religions, that law is constitutionally invalid even though the
burden may be characterized as being only indirect” (alteration in original) (quoting Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961))).
15. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 547; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.
16. Cf. Ellis M. West, The Right to Religion-Based Exemptions in Early America: The
Cause of Conscientious Objectors to Conscription, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 367, 371 (1993–94)
(“[T]hose who rely on the intentions of the founders to justify the argument for a right to religionbased exemptions can find very little historical evidence to substantiate their claim.”).
17. See infra Section IV.A.
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particularly where such effects, if they had resulted from state action,
would infringe on third parties’ constitutional rights. Fourth, the Court
should consider whether a religious liberty claim involves practices that
are central to the individual’s belief system. It is one thing for an Amish
family to claim that a compulsory education law infringes on the
fundamental tenets of their religious faith.18 It is another thing for
individuals to claim that issuing marriage licenses in their public capacity
as county clerks infringes on their right to freely practice religion, to
freely discriminate (which often coincides with such claims), or to
express moral disapproval of a particular group.19
This test will appropriately balance the free exercise of religion with
the guarantee that all citizens enjoy equal liberty, equal dignity, and equal
protection of the law, and will further the broader purposes of the First
Amendment.20 Part II examines the original purpose of the free speech
clause of the First Amendment and discusses how the Court has
contextualized the right to freely express one’s views, particularly when
speech has a deleterious impact on third parties.21 Part II concludes by
arguing that this approach should be adopted in the free exercise context.
Part III examines the original purpose of the free exercise clause and
explains how the Court has failed to create a workable test to balance an
individual’s religious liberty with the rights of those who may suffer
discrimination or other harms from the exercise of religious beliefs. Part
IV introduces a new, context-based paradigm for adjudicating religious
liberty claims under both the free exercise clause and the federal
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 199322 (and its counterparts at the
state level) and analogizes to provisions in the Bill of Rights where the
Court has adopted the same approach. Part IV also provides examples of
how this test would apply to specific religious liberty claims. Ultimately,
the Court should interpret the Constitution by recognizing the importance
of “fair terms of social cooperation on the basis of mutual respect”23 and
of the need to embrace equality as the foundation of individual and
collective liberty. After all, if liberty can find no refuge in a jurisprudence
of doubt, it can find no salvation in a jurisprudence that countenances
unequal protection of the law.24
18. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 236 (1972).
19. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582 (2003) (“Moral disapproval of
this group [homosexuals] . . . is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under
the Equal Protection Clause.” (citing Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973))).
20. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise
[of religion].”).
21. See id. (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.”).
22. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb
(2012)).
23. James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1, 18 (1995).
24. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 901 (1992).
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I. THE CONTEXTUAL ORIGINS OF THE FREE SPEECH CLAUSE
The text of the First Amendment’s free speech clause and evidence
from early debates in Congress reveal that the Founders intended the First
Amendment to preserve federalism by limiting the federal government’s
ability to intrude on the states’ authority to regulate speech.25
Additionally, the Founders sought to facilitate a marketplace of ideas that
welcomed unpopular, distasteful, or offensive speech and promoted a
robust democratic process, but did not necessarily view the regulation—
or outright prohibition—of some types of speech as inconsistent with this
objective.26 The interplay between these purposes demonstrates that the
right to freely express one’s ideas was never intended to be a vehicle by
which citizens can evade legal responsibilities.
A. The Right to Freely Express One’s Views is Subject to Reasonable
State Regulation
Although freedom of speech is understood “as a cornerstone of
individual liberty,”27 it may be regulated in a variety of contexts. Dutch
philosopher Benedict de Spinoza believed that although freedom of
speech was based upon the “‘indefeasible natural right’ of individuals,”
in some circumstances “government could punish speech if a man spoke
opinions ‘which by their very nature nullify the [social] compact.’”28
Spinoza’s view, along with those of Sir William Blackstone, informed
the Founders’ view of free speech.29 Although recognizing that “[e]very
25. See, e.g., John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311,
1392–93 (1997) (stating that “the main purpose of the First Amendment and much of the Bill of
Rights . . . simply was to deny the federal government power rather than to define the rights of
the individual”).
26. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying
the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.” (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 414 (1989))).
27. Michael A. Henderson, Today’s Symbolic Speech Dilemma: Flag Desecration and the
Proposed Constitutional Amendment, 41 S.D. L. REV. 533, 535 (1996).
28. Michael Kahn, The Origination and Early Development of Free Speech in the United
States: A Brief Overview, FLA. B.J., Oct. 2002, at 71, 71 (alteration in original).
29. Id. at 72. Blackstone stated as follows:
[T]he liberty of the press . . . consists in laying no previous restraints upon
publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when
published. . . . To subject the press to the restrictive power of a licensor [is] to
subject all freedom of sentiment to the prejudices of one man, and make him the
arbitrary and infallible judge of all controverted points in learning, religion, and
government. But to punish (as the law does at present) any dangerous or
offensive writings, which, when published, shall on a fair and impartial trial be
adjudged of a pernicious tendency, is necessary for the preservation of peace and
good order, of government and religion, the only solid foundations of civil
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free man has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before
the public,” Blackstone argued that some types of speech should not
receive First Amendment protection, “including speech that was
‘blasphemous, immoral, treasonable, schismatical, seditious, or
scandalous libels.’”30
Influenced by these views, “The Founders’ conception of free
speech . . . was vastly different from contemporary versions,” as
they rejected the idea that “all points of view [must] have access to public
debate.”31 Rather, the Founders embraced Blackstone’s view that some
types of speech could be restricted.32 In fact, elected officials “from both
major factions endorsed a quite different proposition: government, if not
at the national then at the state level, had a positive responsibility to
monitor—and, when necessary, to step in and moderate—political
communication.”33
B. The Connection Between Liberty and Decentralization
The Founders did not conceive of the First Amendment “as a
guarantee of personal freedom nor even as a protection of democratic
processes.”34 Instead, the Founders intended the First Amendment to
preserve federalism, particularly decentralization:
The core First Amendment concern was centralization.
The Founders believed that they could ensure individual
liberty by limiting the federal government’s power, leaving
as the domain of the states all but the categories of federal
authority specifically enumerated in the Constitution. They
counted on the states to maintain this allocation—to combat
centralization—through the political process. The Framers
of the Bill of Rights well understood that the states’ ability
to perform this role depended crucially upon First
Amendment protection from federal government
censorship.35
liberty.
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151–52).
30. Id. at 71 (emphasis added) (quoting 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *151).
31. David Yassky, Eras of the First Amendment, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1699, 1707 (1991).
32. See id.
33. NORMAN L. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MEN: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF
THE LAW OF LIBEL 100 (1986).
34. Yassky, supra note 31, at 1713 (finding instead that the First Amendment was “aimed
at safeguarding the federal system”).
35. Id. (emphasis added). Senator John Lansing reaffirmed this view, stating as follows:
It has been observed, that, as the people must, of necessity, delegate essential
powers either to the individual or general sovereignties, it is perfectly immaterial
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Thus, “each state had to determine for itself how much speech to
permit,”36 which underscores the Founders’ broader view that the
Constitution’s structural constraints were inextricably linked to
achieving individual and collective liberty:
From the Founding to the Civil War, the purpose and effect
of the First Amendment was to leave regulation of speech to
the states. This particular concern with the power of the
central government reflected the larger theory of
the Founders. In the original constitutional vision, liberty
was tied to the independence of the states. This theory was
embedded in the constitutional structure. The separation of
powers, the enumeration of powers in Article I, Section 8,
and the Bill of Rights all aimed at checking the federal
government, thereby ensuring that states would remain the
primary loci of lawmaking authority. The First Amendment
was a central component of the federal structure. It protected
not only the rights of individual citizens, but also the
prerogatives of the states, and, most important, the vitality of
the state-based political process.37
The movement by the southern states to prohibit literature that
advocated for the abolition of slavery also supports this interpretation.38
In response to this movement, President Andrew Jackson supported the
states’ position and proposed legislation to outlaw any discussion of
slavery through the mails.39 However, representatives from the southern
states believed that the “injection of the federal government into the arena
of slavery and speech directly contravened the South’s commitment to
principles of states’ rights.”40 Specifically, Jackson’s legislation
authorized federal government censorship over the mails, which “would
have rescinded one of the crucial constitutional protections of state
independence, the First Amendment.”41 As a result, South Carolina
Senator John Calhoun proposed alternative legislation, arguing that
Jackson’s proposal violated ‘“one of the most sacred provisions of the
constitution, and [was] subversive of reserved powers essential to the
where they are lodged; but, as the state governments will always possess a better
representation of the feelings and interests of the people at large, it is obvious
that those powers can be deposited with much greater safety with the state than
the general government.
Id. at 1708 (quoting 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVETIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
217 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836)).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1716–17 (emphasis added).
38. See id. at 1716.
39. Id. at 1714.
40. Id.
41. Id.

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
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preservation of the domestic institutions of the slave-holding States, and,
with them, their peace and security.”’42 Put simply, the southern states’
interest in abolishing abolitionist literature was secondary to ensuring a
decentralized governance process.
Ultimately, the Founders likely intended that the First Amendment
would be a limit on federal power and, consistent with the goal of
decentralization, would enable states, including after the Supreme Court
held in Gitlow v. New York43 that the First Amendment was incorporated
into the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, to regulate speech in gray
areas where the Constitution’s text and original meaning are
indeterminate.44 For example, states would likely have the authority to
decide if a corporation was a “person” under the First Amendment and to
limit the amount of money that individuals and groups can contribute to
political candidates.45 Of course, the First Amendment’s role in
promoting decentralization must not be interpreted to undermine its
second purpose: facilitating robust public discourse on matters of social
and political importance.
C. A Robust Marketplace of Ideas
The First Amendment furthers robust debate on matters of public
import. In Snyder v. Phelps,46 the Court emphasized that “[s]peech on
‘matters of public concern’ . . . is ‘at the heart of the First
Amendment’s protection.’”47 Writing for the majority, Justice Roberts
42. Id. at 1715 (quoting 12 REGISTER OF DEBATES IN CONGRESS pt. 4, app. at 72 (1836)).
Senator Calhoun further stated as follows:
It would indeed have been but a poor triumph for the cause of liberty, in the great
contest of 1799, had the sedition law been put down on principles that would
have left Congress free to suppress the circulation, through the mail, of the very
publications which that odious act was intended to prohibit. The authors of that
memorable achievement would have had but slender claims on the gratitude of
posterity, if their victory over the encroachment of power had been left so
imperfect.
Id. (quoting 12 REGISTER OF DEBATES IN CONGRESS, supra, pt. 4, app. at 73).
43. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
44. Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 525–
26 (2003) (“During the ratification debates, Anti-Federalists complained that
the Constitution’s language was ambiguous and obscure. The Constitution’s supporters
responded that the document had been drafted with as much precision as possible, but they
acknowledged that some indeterminacy was inevitable.” (footnotes omitted)).
45. See generally, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 318–19, 365 (2010)
(invalidating a federal law that, among other things, banned corporations and labor unions from
using general treasury funds to expressly advocate for political candidates within thirty days of a
primary election).
46. 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
47. Id. at 451–52 (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S.
749, 758–59 (1985)).
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explained that the right to freely express one’s views reflects “a profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”48 Justice Roberts also noted that
“speech concerning public affairs is . . . the essence of selfgovernment,”49 “occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First
Amendment values, and is entitled to special protection.”50 Thus, the
government cannot “restrict expression because of its message, its ideas,
its subject matter, or its content.”51 Additionally, and “[i]n light of the
substantial and expansive threats to free expression posed by contentbased restrictions,” the Court has rejected “a ‘free-floating test for First
Amendment coverage . . . [based on] an ad hoc balancing of relative
social costs and benefits.’”52
D. The Slow but Steady Contextualization of Free Speech
Notwithstanding the robust protections afforded to free speech,
“[e]ven protected speech is not equally permissible in all places and at all
times.”53 Provided that a law does not restrict speech on the basis of
content, the analysis shifts to whether the speech’s value outweighs
competing societal values in its restriction. As one scholar notes, “[T]he
Court has not hesitated to explore the limit of the right of freedom
of speech as it interferes with competing constitutional values.”54 For
example, states may regulate the “dangerous secondary effects” of speech
and enact reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on speech,55
and afford some types of speech different levels of constitutional
protection.56 Furthermore, several categories of speech receive no
48. Id. at 452 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
49. Id. (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964)).
50. Id. (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983)). In Snyder, the Court held
that speech is considered a “matter[] of public concern when it can ‘be fairly considered as relating
to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community,’ or when it ‘is a subject of
legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the
public.’” Id. at 453 (citation omitted) (first quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 146; then quoting San
Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004)); see also Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S.
469, 492–94 (1975) (noting the importance of public scrutiny of matters of public concern); Time,
Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387–88 (1967) (recognizing the importance of public matters).
51. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2543 (2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. Am. Civil
Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002)).
52. Id. at 2544 (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct.
1577, 1585 (2010)) (stating that “the Constitution ‘demands that content-based restrictions
on speech be presumed invalid . . . and that the Government bear the burden of showing their
constitutionality’” (quoting Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 660)).
53. Snyder, 562 U.S. at 456 (alteration in original) (quoting Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,
480 (1988)).
54. Justin Kirk Houser, Comment, Is Hate Speech Becoming the New Blasphemy? Lessons
from an American Constitutional Dialectic, 114 PA. ST. L. REV. 571, 595 (2009).
55. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
56. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985) (finding
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constitutional protection whatsoever.57
1. Examples of Regulating Protected Speech
The United States Supreme Court’s jurisprudence demonstrates that,
although among the highest of constitutional values, free speech can be
regulated and, in some cases, prohibited based on the harmful effects and,
implicitly, value of such speech.
a. The Secondary Effects Doctrine
The secondary effects doctrine permits the government to suppress
speech because of its adverse side effects, which typically requires states
to show that otherwise-protected speech is accompanied by conduct that
the government may legally proscribe.58 Put differently, states may
regulate the “secondary effects” of speech provided that such regulation
is not a veiled attempt to suppress speech on the basis of its content. As
the Court has recognized, “municipalities must be given a ‘reasonable
opportunity
to
experiment
with
solutions’
to
address
the secondary effects of protected speech.”59

that “‘commercial speech’ is entitled to the protection of the First Amendment, albeit to protection
somewhat less extensive than that afforded to ‘noncommercial speech’”).
57. Frequently Asked Questions–Speech, FIRST AMEND. CTR., http://www.firstamendment
center.org/faq/frequently-asked-questions-speech/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2017) (including
obscenity, defamation, child pornography, perjury, and blackmail in a list of types of speech not
protected by the First Amendment).
58. David L. Hudson, Jr., The Secondary Effects Doctrine: Stripping Away First
Amendment Freedoms, 23 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 19, 20 (2012); see also R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383–84 (1992) (noting that some types of speech “can . . . be
regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity, defamation,
etc.) . . . [but cannot] be made the vehicles for content discrimination unrelated to their
distinctively proscribable content” (emphasis omitted)); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (“We have often approved [time, place, and
manner] restrictions . . . provided that they are justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech, that they serve a significant governmental interest . . . .”).
59. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 439 (2002) (quoting Renton
v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 52 (1986)); see also Renton, 475 U.S. at 48 (upholding a
law prohibiting adult theaters from operating in certain areas based on considerations such as
crime rates, property values, and the quality of the city’s neighborhoods); Christopher J. Andrew,
Note, The Secondary Effects Doctrine: The Historical Development, Current Application, and
Potential Mischaracterization of an Elusive Judicial Precedent, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 1175, 1175
(2002) (“The secondary effects doctrine allows a court to characterize a speech regulation as
content-neutral instead of content-based and apply intermediate scrutiny if the regulation is aimed
at suppressing the ‘secondary effects’ of the speech and not the speech itself.”).
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b. Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions
In addition, states may enact reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions to further important governmental interests.60 Such
restrictions are permitted if they “are justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech, . . . narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest, and . . . leave open ample alternative
channels for communication of the information.”61 Laws satisfying this
standard will be upheld “even if [they have] an incidental effect on some
speakers or messages but not others.”62 This reflects the well-settled
principle that “[t]he First and Fourteenth Amendments have never been
treated as absolutes,”63 and that the right to engage in protected speech
must be weighed against the government’s interest in regulating its
dissemination.
c. Speech on Matters of Private Concern
Private speech does not implicate the core purposes of the First
Amendment and therefore receives a lesser degree of constitutional
protection.64 As the Court explained in Snyder, when laws restrict private
speech, “‘[t]here is no threat to the free and robust debate of public issues;
there is no potential interference with a meaningful dialogue of ideas’;
and the ‘threat of liability’ does not pose the risk of ‘a reaction of selfcensorship’ on matters of public import.”65
d. Commercial Speech
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission of New York,66 the Court created a distinction between
60. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (“[E]ven in a public forum the government may impose
reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech . . . .”).
61. Id. (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
62. Id. (emphasis added); see also Renton, 475 U.S. at 47–48 (discussing how a legislative
intent to suppress free speech will invalidate a law, but if there is no such intent and there is a
substantial governmental interest, the law will be upheld); Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647–48 (1981) (“We have often approved restrictions of that
kind provided that they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that
they serve a significant governmental interest, and that in doing so they leave open ample
alternative channels for communication of the information.” (quoting Va. State Bd., 425 U.S. at
771)).
63. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951).
64. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011) (“[W]here matters of purely private
significance are at issue, First Amendment protections are often less rigorous. That is because
restricting speech on purely private matters does not implicate the same constitutional concerns
as limiting speech on matters of public interest . . . .” (citations omitted)).
65. Id. (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760
(1985)).
66. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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commercial speech and other types of speech.67 Commercial speech
consists of ‘“speech proposing a commercial transaction [and] occurs in
an area traditionally subject to government regulation.”’68 Furthermore,
“competing constitutional values,” including the interest in protecting the
public from misleading advertising, warrants a lesser degree of protection
for commercial speech.69 As a result, commercial speech that contains
inaccurate representations to the public receives no constitutional
protection.70
2. Banning Certain Types of Speech
Some types of speech garner no constitutional protection. In R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul,71 the Court noted that
[O]ur society, like other free but civilized societies, has
permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few
limited areas, which are “of such slight social value as a step
to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality.”72
For example, obscenity, fighting words, and defamatory utterances
receive no constitutional protection.73

67. Id. at 562.
68. Id. (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978)).
69. Houser, supra note 54, at 595.
70. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec., 447 U.S. at 563–64 (discussing that “[t]he government
may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it,” although
where “the communication is neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity . . . [t]he State
must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by restrictions on commercial speech” (citing
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979); Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 447). The Court created a four-part
test to evaluate the constitutionality of laws restricting commercial speech:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First
Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least
must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the
asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive
answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest.
Id. at 566.
71. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
72. Id. at 382–83 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (noting
that the right to free speech “does not include a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations”).
73. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 57.
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a. Obscenity
74

In Miller v. California, the Court held that speech deemed legally
obscene is entitled to no constitutional protection.75 The Miller Court
explained that ‘“[t]here are certain well-defined and narrowly limited
classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.”’76 This includes lewd
and obscene language, as “such utterances are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by
the social interest in order and morality.”77 In so holding, the Court
adopted a four-part obscenity test, which examined
(a) whether “the average person, applying contemporary
community standards” would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.78
b. Fighting Words
The Court affords no protection to “fighting words,” which are
defined as “advocacy intended, and likely, to incite imminent lawless
action.” Typically, fighting words consist of statements “where the
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to
commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of
individuals.”79 Similarly, “epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper
sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the
Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no question
under that instrument.”80
c. Defamatory Speech
Speech that harms an individual’s reputation likewise warrants no
First Amendment protection.81 In fact, at common law, if a speaker’s
74. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
75. Id. at 23.
76. Id. at 20 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72).
77. Id. at 20–21 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72) (noting that obscenity was
“utterly without redeeming social importance”).
78. Id. at 24 (citations omitted) (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972)).
79. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S.
705 (1969)); see also Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (finding that “political hyperbole”
is not a true threat).
80. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309–10 (1940).
81. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) (citing Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343
U.S. 250 (1952)).
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opinions caused reputational damages, the speaker could be held liable
for damages.82 As the Court acknowledged in Milkovich v. Lorain
Journal Co.,83 “[t]his position was maintained even though the truth or
falsity of an opinion—as distinguished from a statement of fact—is not a
matter that can be objectively determined and truth is a complete defense
to a suit for defamation.”84
E. Themes Emerging from the Court’s Free Speech Jurisprudence
The Court’s jurisprudence is consistent with the Founders’ vision that
the First Amendment promote decentralization and robust public
discourse.85 The Court has held in a variety of contexts that the states may
regulate the time, place, and manner in which speech is disseminated to
further competing social, community, and constitutional interests.86
Whether a law targets the deleterious secondary effects of speech (e.g.,
cross burning) or outlaws speech that has no value whatsoever, there can
be no question that states play a significant role in defining the boundaries
of permissible speech, and that countervailing societal community
interests matter in shaping the scope of free speech rights. Indeed,
individual liberty is “tied to the independence of the states” and depends
“crucially upon First Amendment protection from federal government
censorship.”87
An approach that vests states with the authority to regulate speech in
light of the competing interest of its citizenry, including avoiding the
harms that some types of speech cause, makes eminent sense. For
example, if the First Amendment were construed to permit individuals to
manufacture and disseminate obscenity, such as depictions of child
82. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 13 (1990) (citations omitted) (stating
that, at common law, “defamatory communications were deemed actionable regardless of whether
they were deemed to be statements of fact or opinion”).
83. 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
84. Id. at 13 (emphasis added) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. a
(AM. LAW INST. 1977)).
85. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451–52 (2011) (“[S]peech on ‘matters of
public concern’ . . . is ‘at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection.’” (alteration in original)
(quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758–59 (1985))).
86. See supra text accompanying notes 60–61.
87. Yassky, supra note 31, at 1713, 1717. Senator John Lansing reaffirmed this view,
stating as follows:
It has been observed, that, as the people must, of necessity, delegate essential
powers either to the individual or general sovereignties, it is perfectly immaterial
where they are lodged; but, as the state governments will always possess a better
representation of the feelings and interests of the people at large, it is obvious
that those powers can be deposited with much greater safety with the state than
the general government.
Id. at 1708 (quoting 2 DEBATES, supra note 35, at 217).
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pornography, it would result in material and severe harm to the victims
of child pornography. Similarly, if individuals were permitted to incite
violence towards individuals and groups because of their race, ethnicity,
or gender, many citizens would be subject to severe and possibly
irreparable injury.
Put differently, the right to freely express one’s views should not be
construed merely as a shield from impermissible governmental
regulation, but as a potential sword that can deprive other citizens of basic
constitutional protections. States have the authority to enact reasonable
restrictions on speech that account for the speaker’s relationship to other
citizens.88 For this reason, laws regulating speech that further important
community interests should not be construed as governmental intrusion
on speech per se, but as content-neutral regulations that promote the equal
liberties and protections of all citizens. Such an effects-driven approach
to the First Amendment, which already permeates the Court’s
jurisprudence, underscores the principle that there are limited
circumstances in which the exercise of an individual right can undermine
collective liberty. Thus, provided that a law does not discriminate on the
basis of content, the protection afforded to speech should depend in
substantial part on a delicate balancing that considers utility, social value,
and third-party harm. Indeed, “as has been seen in the case of obscenity,
the desire for prohibiting speech to defend community ideals remains
strong.”89
The Court should adopt the same approach in the free exercise context
because not all religious practices warrant the same degree of
constitutional protection, and because the exercise of some religious
beliefs can infringe on the equal rights and liberties of other citizens. An
effects-driven framework would further a vital principle that lies at the
heart of American constitutionalism: The right of all citizens to equal
liberty and equal protection of the law must, in some circumstances,
trump the individual’s exercise of a fundamental constitutional right.
II. THE ORIGINAL PURPOSE OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
The text and historical record of the free exercise clause’s adoption
demonstrate that, although religious liberty is among the most sacrosanct
of constitutional rights, it does not require the government to grant
citizens exemptions from generally applicable laws that further
legitimate, secular government purposes.90 Consequently, the Court has
emphasized that the states may “by general and non-discriminatory
88. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (protecting citizens from speech
that, among other things, appeals to the prurient interest and has no literary, scientific, or artistic
value).
89. Houser, supra note 54, at 595.
90. E.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 555 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he right to free exercise was viewed as generally superior to ordinary legislation, to be
overridden only when necessary to secure important government purposes.”).
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legislation . . . safeguard the peace, good order and comfort of the
community, without unconstitutionally invading the liberties protected
by the Fourteenth [or First] Amendment.”91 As such, the free exercise of
religion may experience “some slight inconvenience in order that the state
may protect its citizens from injury.”92
A. Justice O’Connor’s Correct View in City of Boerne v. Flores—With
One Exception
In City of Boerne v. Flores,93 the Court held that the federal Religious
Freedom Restoration Act could not be applied to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment.94 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy held
that “[i]f Congress could define its own powers by altering the Fourteenth
Amendment’s meaning, no longer would the Constitution be ‘superior
paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means.’”95
Justice O’Connor dissented and articulated an interpretation of the
free exercise clause that is arguably consistent with its original purpose.96
O’Connor believed that the “drafters and ratifiers more likely viewed the
Free Exercise Clause as a guarantee that government may not
91. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940).
92. Id. at 306.
93. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
94. Id. at 527, 536 (“Any suggestion that Congress has a substantive, non-remedial power
under the Fourteenth Amendment is not supported by our case law.”).
95. Id. at 529. The Court’s decision is beyond the scope of this Article and irrelevant to the
issues addressed here.
96. See id. at 546–47 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). In her dissenting opinion, Justice
O’Connor noted as follows:
In Smith, five Members of this Court—without briefing or argument on the
issue—interpreted the Free Exercise Clause to permit the government to prohibit,
without justification, conduct mandated by an individual’s religious beliefs, so
long as the prohibition is generally applicable. Contrary to the Court’s holding
in that case, however, the Free Exercise Clause is not simply an
antidiscrimination principle that protects only against those laws that single out
religious practice for unfavorable treatment. Rather, the Clause is best
understood as an affirmative guarantee of the right to participate in religious
practices and conduct without impermissible governmental interference, even
when such conduct conflicts with a neutral, generally applicable law.
Before Smith, our free exercise cases were generally in keeping with this idea:
where a law substantially burdened religiously motivated conduct—regardless
whether it was specifically targeted at religion or applied generally—we required
government to justify that law with a compelling state interest and to use means
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.
Id. (citation omitted); see also Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520, 570–71 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring) (stating that it is “difficult to escape
the conclusion that, whatever Smith’s virtues, they do not include a comfortable fit with
settled law”).
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unnecessarily hinder believers from freely practicing their religion.”97 As
such, the free exercise clause is “not simply an antidiscrimination
principle that protects only against those laws that single out religious
practice for unfavorable treatment.”98 Rather, the clause guarantees the
“right to participate in religious practices and conduct without
impermissible government interference, even when such conduct
conflicts with a neutral, generally applicable law.”99 Accordingly, Justice
O’Connor argued for a rule requiring the government “to justify any
substantial burden on religiously motivated conduct by a compelling state
interest and to impose that burden only by means narrowly tailored to
achieve that interest.”100
To support these conclusions, Justice O’Connor examined the
historical development of the free exercise clause. Rhode Island’s Charter
of 1663, for example, used the term “liberty of conscience,” and protected
residents from being “molested, punished, disquieted, or called into
question,” for expressing their religious beliefs.101 The Charter also
stated that residents may “freely, and fully have and enjoy his and their
own judgments, and conscience in matters of religious concernments,”
although residents were prohibited from “using this liberty to
licentiousness and profaneness; nor to the civil injury, or outward
disturbance of others.”102
Additionally, Justice O’Connor relied on evidence immediately
preceding ratification, noting that most provisions at the state level
“guaranteed free exercise of religion or liberty of conscience, limited by
particular, defined state interests.”103 For example, the New York
Constitution of 1777 stated that “[t]he free exercise and enjoyment of
97. Flores, 521 U.S. at 549 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 546.
99. Id. at 538 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Mark David Hall, Jeffersonian Walls and
Madisonian Lines: The Supreme Court’s Use of History in Religion Clause Cases, 85 OR. L. REV.
563, 570 (2006) (noting that Justice O’Connor, in the Flores opinion, “offered a sweeping
examination of Founding era history to support her thesis that the ‘drafters and ratifiers more
likely viewed the Free Exercise Clause as a guarantee that government may not unnecessarily
hinder believers from freely practicing their religion’” (quoting Flores, 521 U.S. at 549
(O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
100. Flores, 521 U.S. at 548 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 551.
102. Id. at 551–52 (emphasis added). Justice O’Connor also relied on the first free exercise
clause, which was drafted in 1649 and stated in relevant part that:
[N]oe person . . . professing to beleive in Jesus Christ, shall from henceforth bee
any waies troubled, Molested or discountenanced for or in respect of his or her
religion nor in the free exercise thereof . . . nor any way [be] compelled to the
beleife or exercise of any other Religion against his or her consent . . . .
Id. at 551 (alterations in original) (quoting Act Concerning Religion of 1649).
103. Id. at 553.
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religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference,
shall forever hereafter be allowed, within this State, to all mankind.”104
Importantly, however, New York’s Constitution mandated that the
“liberty of conscience . . . shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of
licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety
of this State.”105 Similarly, the religious liberty clause of the Georgia
Constitution of 1777, while providing that “[a]ll persons whatever shall
have the free exercise of their religion,” was not intended to proscribe
laws that prohibited conduct “repugnant to the peace and safety of the
State.”106
Noting that “[t]hese state provisions . . . are perhaps the best evidence
of the original understanding of the Constitution’s protection of religious
liberty,” Justice O’Connor concluded that “it is reasonable to think that
the States that ratified the First Amendment assumed that the meaning of
the federal free exercise provision corresponded to that of their existing
104. Id. (quoting N.Y. CONST. art. XXXVIII (1777)). Justice O’Connor also cited the New
Hampshire Constitution of 1784, which stated:
Every individual has a natural and unalienable right to worship GOD according
to the dictates of his own conscience, and reason; and no subject shall be hurt,
molested, or restrained in his person, liberty or estate for worshipping GOD, in
the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of his own
conscience, . . . provided he doth not disturb the public peace, or disturb
others, in their religious worship.
Id. (quoting N.H. CONST. art. I, § 5 (1784) (emphasis added)). Additionally, the Maryland
Declaration of Rights of 1776 provided that:
[N]o person ought by any law to be molested in his person or estate on account
of his religious persuasion or profession, or for his religious practice; unless,
under colour of religion, any man shall disturb the good order, peace or safety
of the State, or shall infringe the laws of morality, or injure others, in their
natural, civil, or religious rights.
Id. at 553–54 (alteration in original) (quoting MD. CONST. art. XXXIII (1776) (emphasis added)).
105. Id. at 553 (quoting N.Y. CONST. art. XXXVIII (1777) (emphasis added)). Justice
O’Connor cited the Virginia Constitutional Convention, where in 1776 the first draft of the federal
free exercise clause was completed:
That religion, or the duty which we owe to our CREATOR, and the manner of
discharging it, can be (directed) only by reason and conviction, not by force or
violence; and therefore, that all men should enjoy the fullest toleration in the
exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience, unpunished and
unrestrained by the magistrate, unless, under colour of religion, any man disturb
the peace, the happiness, or safety of society. And that it is the mutual duty of all
to practice Christian forbearance, love, and charity towards each other.
Id. at 555 (quoting COMMITTEE DRAFT OF THE VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 18 (1776)
(emphasis added)).
106. Id. at 554 (quoting GA. CONST. art. LVI (1777) (emphasis added)).
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state clauses.”107 Furthermore, the manner in which conflicts between
state and religious law conflicted “suggest that Americans in the Colonies
and early States thought that, if an individual’s religious scruples
prevented him from complying with a generally applicable law, the
government should, if possible, excuse the person from the law’s
coverage.”108 For example, “Quakers and certain other Protestant sects
refused on Biblical grounds to subscribe to oaths or ‘swear’ allegiance to
civil authority.”109 Absent such “accommodation, their beliefs would
have prevented them from participating in civic activities involving oaths,
including testifying in court.”110 Likewise, the practice of “excusing
religious pacifists from military service demonstrates that, long before
the First Amendment was ratified, legislative accommodations were a
common response to conflicts between religious practice and civil
obligation.”111 In addition, “[b]oth North Carolina and Maryland excused
Quakers from the requirement of removing their hats in court; Rhode
Island exempted Jews from the requirements of the state marriage laws;
and Georgia allowed groups of European immigrants to organize whole
towns according to their own faith.”112
Finally, Justice O’Connor relied on the drafting history leading to the
adoption of the federal free exercise clause, particularly James Madison’s
draft, which included the words “freedom of conscience”:
That religion, or the duty we owe our Creator, and the
manner of discharging it, being under the direction of reason
and conviction only, not of violence or compulsion, all men
are equally entitled to the full and free exercise of it,
according to the dictates of conscience; and therefore that no
man or class of men ought on account of religion to be
invested with peculiar emoluments or privileges, nor
subjected to any penalties or disabilities, unless under color
of religion the preservation of equal liberty, and the
existence of the State be manifestly endangered.113
Additionally, Thomas Jefferson wrote that government could interfere
in religious exercise when necessary to ensure peace and public safety.114
George Washington expressed similar sentiments, stating that

107. Id. at 553.
108. Id. at 557.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 558.
111. Id. at 559.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 555–56 (quoting Gaillard Hunt, James Madison and Religious Liberty, 1 ANN.
REP. AM. HIST. ASS’N 163, 166–67 (1901) (emphasis added)).
114. See id. at 562 (quoting 11 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 428–29 (Andrew A.
Lipscomb ed., 1905)).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2018

21

Florida Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 1

702

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

[i]n my opinion the conscientious scruples of all men should
be treated with great delicacy and tenderness; and it is my
wish and desire, that the laws may always be as extensively
accommodated to them, as a due regard to the protection and
essential interests of the nation may justify and permit.115
Thus, for Justice O’Connor the right to freely exercise one’s religion
was an “essential liberty,” and government could only interfere in
religious matters “when necessary to protect the civil peace or to prevent
‘licentiousness.’”116 Put differently, the free exercise clause “is properly
understood as an affirmative guarantee of the right to participate in
religious activities without impermissible governmental interference,
even where a believer’s conduct is in tension with a law of general
application.”117 Justice O’Connor stated as follows:
Foremost, these early leaders accorded religious exercise a
special constitutional status. The right to free exercise was a
substantive guarantee of individual liberty, no less important
than the right to free speech or the right to just compensation
for the taking of property. . . .
...
Second, all agreed that government interference in
religious practice was not to be lightly countenanced.
Finally, all shared the conviction that “true religion and good
morals are the only solid foundation of public liberty and
happiness.”118
Moreover, “[g]iven the centrality of freedom of speech and religion to
the American concept of personal liberty, it is altogether reasonable to
conclude that both should be treated with the highest degree of
respect.”119
Justice O’Connor’s interpretation is arguably consistent with the text
and purpose of the free exercise clause, but with one important exception:
the drafters did not believe that the clause required the government to

115. Id. (quoting Letter from George Washington to the Religious Soc’y Called Quakers
(Oct. 13, 1789)).
116. Id. at 552 (stating that “when religious beliefs conflicted with civil law, religion
prevailed unless important state interests militated otherwise”).
117. Id. at 564. “It is reasonable to presume that the drafters and ratifiers of the First
Amendment—many of whom served in state legislatures—assumed courts would apply the Free
Exercise Clause similarly, so that religious liberty was safeguarded.” Id. at 560.
118. Id. at 563–64 (citation omitted) (quoting THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS 219
(1983)).
119. Id. at 564–65.
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accommodate the free exercise of religion.120 To begin with, the state
provisions upon which Justice O’Connor relied expressly permitted
restrictions on the free exercise of religion when necessary to protect
peace and safety. Additionally, although James Madison proposed two
amendments that contained language protecting the “equal rights of
conscience,”121 later revisions eliminated this language.122 The
penultimate revision stated as follows:
Congress shall make no law establishing articles of faith or
a mode of worship, or prohibiting the free exercise of
religion, or abridging the freedom of speech, or the press, or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and petition to
the government for the redress of grievances.123
Thus, even though the drafters did not articulate a precise definition
of “the phrases ‘free exercise’ or ‘rights of conscience,’”124 the
elimination of the latter phrases intimates that conscientious objections to
civil laws were not considered a part of the free exercise of religion:
[S]ome members of the House might have thought that these
two phrases denoted different types of protection, because
they included both phrases in their versions of the
amendment. If so, the record does not include their
explanations of what the differences were. And if such
differences did exist, the Senate may have made the point
moot by quickly eliminating the text “rights of
conscience.”125
As one scholar explains, the First Congress’ deliberations and the final
version of the free exercise clause “strongly suggests that the . . . First
Congress did not understand the Free Exercise Clause to [include a right
to religious] exemptions from generally applicable laws.”126
In addition, the history of the Second Amendment’s drafting process,
which occurred at the same time, underscores this view. Although early
120. See Vincent Phillip Muñoz, The Original Meaning of the Free Exercise Clause: The
Evidence from the First Congress, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1083, 1109 (2008).
121. Id. at 1105–07. The first of these, which was directed at the federal government,
provided that “[t]he civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship,
nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be
in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed.” Id. at 1102–03 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451
(Joseph Gales ed., 1834)). The second was directed at the states and stated that “[n]o State shall
violate the equal rights of conscience, or the freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal
cases.” Id. at 1103 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 452).
122. Id. at 1107.
123. Id. at 1108 (quoting S. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1789)).
124. Id. at 1109.
125. Id. (footnote omitted).
126. Id. at 1086.
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drafts exempted religious objectors from military service, subsequent
drafts began to qualify the scope of such exemptions, and the ensuing
debate among members of Congress confirms that the conscientious
objector provision was limited in scope.127 Representative Egbert Benson
moved to eliminate the conscientious objector provision entirely,
believing that it was not “part of the natural right to religious liberty,” and
that, with the exemption, the “rights of conscience could not be balanced
against other competing governmental interests.”128 Instead, Benson
believed that the judiciary and legislative branches would “always
possess humanity enough to indulge this class of citizens in a matter they
are so desirous of.”129 In a compromise amendment stating that “no
person religiously scrupulous shall be compelled to bear arms in
person,”130 the words “in person” indicated that the state could impose
alternative obligations on citizens who received exemptions from
particular laws on religious grounds:
[M]any of those who opposed bearing arms were equally
scrupulous of getting substitutes or paying an equivalent. If
religious individuals were understood to possess a right not
to serve in the military on account of conscientious
objection, then for the same reason they also would seem to
possess an equal right not to pay for an equivalent. The
reinsertion of “in person” suggests that the House
understood conscientious objection not to override a
citizen’s civil obligations. Stated differently, “in person”
indicates that the House thought the state legitimately could
demand some actions that burdened religious individuals’
consciences. By restoring the words “in person,” the House
rejected Boudinot’s hope that they “show the world that
127. See id. at 1102–03 (“The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed;
a well armed and well regulated militia being the best security of a free country; but no person
religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render military service in person.”
(quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834)).
128. Id. at 1113–14. Some members of the House disagreed with Benson’s position, and the
division over the conscientious objector provision resulted in a compromise amendment stating
that “no person religiously scrupulous shall be compelled to bear arms in person.” Id. at 1115
(emphasis added).
129. Id. at 1114 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 780). Benson stated as follows:
No man can claim this indulgence of right. It may be a religious persuasion, but
it is no natural right, and therefore ought to be left to the discretion of the
Government. If this stands part of the constitution, it will be a question before
the Judiciary on every regulation you make with respect to the organization of
the militia, whether it comports with this declaration or not. It is extremely
injudicious to intermix matters of doubt with fundamentals.
Id. at 1113 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 780).
130. Id. at 1115 (emphasis added).
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proper care is taken that the Government may not interfere
with the religious sentiments of any person.”131
As one scholar observes, “The concurrent . . . discussions . . .
over . . . exemptions from military service . . . and . . . religious free
exercise . . . suggest that the House did not understand religious free
exercise to include exemptions from generally applicable laws.”132
B. The Court’s Jurisprudence in Light of the Free Exercise Clause’s
Original Purposes and RFRA
As a general matter, the Court’s jurisprudence strongly suggests that
the Free Exercise Clause was not meant to excuse individuals, based on
religious belief, from complying with generally-applicable laws deemed
constitutional. Additionally, several themes emerge from this
jurisprudence that can guide the Court’s and lower courts’ analysis in
future cases.
1. The Applicable Standard
For much of its history the Court has analyzed laws allegedly
infringing on the free exercise clause by inquiring whether it “impose[s]
a substantial burden on the practice of religion, and . . . whether it [is]
needed to serve a compelling government interest.”133 Under the federal
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (and its state counterparts), laws must
not “substantially burden” the free exercise of religion.134
In Employment Division v. Smith,135 however, the Court altered this
standard when upholding a law prohibiting “the knowing or intentional
possession of a ‘controlled substance’ unless the substance has been
prescribed by a medical practitioner.”136 The Respondents, members of a
Native American Church, were fired from their jobs after ingesting
peyote at a religious ceremony.137 They contested the law, arguing that it
violated the free exercise clause.138 In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the
131. Id. at 1115–16 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 796).
132. Id. at 1118. Also stating that the drafters of the free exercise clause did not likely intend
for it to encompass a right “to be exempt from civic obligations on account of their incompatibility
with an individual’s religious beliefs.” Id. at 1117.
133. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2760 (2014); see also
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 400–01, 410 (1963) (holding that an employee who was fired
for refusing to work on her Sabbath could not be denied unemployment benefits); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 209 (1972) (holding that Amish children were not required to comply with
state law mandating that they remain in school until the age of sixteen).
134. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2761 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (2012)).
135. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
136. Id. at 874 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 475.992(4) (1987)).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 878.
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Court upheld the law.139 Noting that the free exercise clause “obviously
excludes all ‘governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such’”140 the
Court held that the right to freely exercise one’s religion did not place
Respondents “beyond the reach of a criminal law that is not specifically
directed at their religious practice, and that is concededly constitutional
as applied to those who use the drug for other reasons.”141 Justice Scalia
emphasized that:
It is a permissible reading of the text, in the one case as in
the other, to say that if prohibiting the exercise of religion
(or burdening the activity of printing) is not the object of the
tax but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable
and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not
been offended.142
As a result, the Court reaffirmed the rule that “the right of free exercise
does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid
and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law
proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or
proscribes).’”143 In so holding, the Court reasoned that the balancing test
used in prior cases “would open the prospect of constitutionally required
religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable
kind.”144
In response, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, which effectively overruled Smith and provided that the
“[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of
religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.”145
If a law substantially burdens religion, individuals are entitled to “an
exemption from the rule unless the Government ‘demonstrates that
application of the burden to the person—(1) is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means
of furthering that compelling governmental interest.’”146 In essence,
Congress re-instated the pre-Smith standard. Thus, the question now
becomes whether Justice Scalia correctly predicted that the pre-Smith
balancing test will require exemptions for the vast majority of citizens
who object to a law on religious grounds. Given the free exercise clause’s
original purpose, the themes that emerged from the Court’s pre-Smith
jurisprudence, and the competing constitutional values of other citizens,
139. Id. at 890.
140. Id. at 877 (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963)).
141. Id. at 878.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 872 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
144. Id. at 888.
145. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2761 (2014) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb-1(a) (2012)).
146. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b)).
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including equal liberty and protection under the law, the answer is no.
2. The Court’s Pre- and Post-Smith Jurisprudence—Five Themes
Emerge
In a manner that is strikingly similar to its free speech jurisprudence,
the Court has afforded varying protections under the free exercise clause
based on the context in which it has been exercised. Although the Court’s
version of contextualization has not resulted in workable rules to guide
legislatures regarding the scope of the free exercise right, several themes
have emerged from this jurisprudence that provide a foundation upon
which to develop a cohesive jurisprudence.
The first theme concerns the distinction between religious beliefs and
practices. In Reynolds v. United States,147 the Court distinguished
between religious beliefs and practices, holding that “[l]aws are made for
the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere
religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.”148
The second theme involves laws that, by design or effect, exact too
significant a burden on individuals’ ability to practice their religious
beliefs or discriminate among religions. In Sherbert v. Verner,149 the
Court invalidated a law that penalized a Seventh-day Adventist for
violating an employer’s six-day work week policy by refusing to work on
Saturdays in accordance with his religion.150 The Court reasoned that
laws infringing on religious beliefs are typically upheld only where they
are designed to prevent “some substantial threat to public safety, peace
or order.”151 Similarly, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,152 the Court held that
Amish children were exempt from a state’s compulsory education law,
which required children to attend public schools until the age of
sixteen.153 The Court emphasized that the law “affirmatively compels
them, under threat of criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at
147. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
148. Id. at 166 (emphasis added). The Court reasoned as follows:
Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious
worship, would it be seriously contended that the civil government under which
he lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice? Or if a wife religiously
believed it was her duty to burn herself upon the funeral pile of her dead husband,
would it be beyond the power of the civil government to prevent her carrying her
belief into practice?
Id.
149. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
150. Id. at 399, 410.
151. Id. at 403 (citing Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); Reynolds,
98 U.S. 145).
152. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
153. Id. at 207, 235–36.
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odds with fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs.”154 Notably,
however, in Sherbert the Court held that generally-applicable laws, even
if incidentally burdening the free exercise of religion, are constitutionally
permissible.
The third theme relates to the state’s involvement in assessing the
validity of religious beliefs. In United States v. Ballard,155 the Court held
that juries may not make judgments regarding the sincerity of an
individual’s religious belief.156 The Court explained that, “if those
doctrines are subject to trial before a jury charged with finding their truth
or falsity, then the same can be done with the religious beliefs of any
sect.”157 Similarly, in Cantwell v. Connecticut,158 the Court invalidated a
law criminalizing solicitation for religious, charitable, or philanthropic
purposes because solicitation permits were based on a state official’s
determination of whether a cause was sufficiently “religious.”159
A fourth theme involves laws that coerce individuals into acting
contrary to their religious beliefs. In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass’n,160 the Court upheld a law that permitted road
construction in areas that were used for religious purposes by a Native
American tribe.161 The Court placed heavy emphasis on the fact that the
tribe was not “coerced by the Government’s action into violating their
religious beliefs,”162 and found that the law did not “penalize religious
activity by denying any person an equal share of the rights, benefits, and
privileges enjoyed by other citizens.”163 As the Court held, states “may
make it more difficult to practice certain religions” so long as the laws
“have no tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their
religious beliefs.”164
The fifth theme concerns laws that impermissibly target specific
religions or religious tenets. In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah,165 the Court invalidated a law banning ritual animal
sacrifice because the record underlying its enactment suggested that it
was targeted at the “suppression of the central element of the Santeria
154. Id. at 218.
155. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
156. Id. at 87–88.
157. Id. at 87. “The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the
establishment of no sect.” Id. at 86 (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 728 (1871)).
158. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
159. Id. at 307 (holding that “to condition the solicitation of aid for the perpetuation of
religious views or systems upon a license, the grant of which rests in the exercise of a
determination by state authority as to what is a religious cause, is to . . . burden . . . the exercise
of liberty protected by the Constitution”).
160. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
161. Id. at 441–42.
162. Id. at 449.
163. Id. (emphasis added).
164. Id. at 450.
165. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
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worship service.”166 In so holding, the Court explained that, “if the object
of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious
motivation,” it is invalid absent a compelling state interest.167 Writing for
the majority, Justice Kennedy held that “[l]egislators may not devise
mechanisms, overt or disguised, designed to persecute or oppress a
religion or its practices.”168
The Court’s most recent jurisprudence does not fall neatly into any of
these categories and underscores the need for a workable standard to
guide the Court in future cases. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby,169 the most
recent post-Smith decision, the Court granted a religious accommodation
to a closely-held corporation that refused to comply with a provision in
the Affordable Health Care Act requiring employers to provide
contraception coverage to female employees.170 Notably, however, the
Court ruled on narrow grounds, holding that the contraception mandate
was invalid only because the Department of Health and Human Services
has alternative and less restrictive means at its disposal to achieve its
stated objectives.171 Thus, although the Court held that the contraception
mandate substantially burdened the corporation’s religious freedom, one
passage in the majority opinion strongly suggests that the Court would
not, in future cases, embrace religious accommodations on the scale that
Justice Scalia predicted in Smith:
The principal dissent raises the possibility that
discrimination in hiring, for example on the basis of race,
might be cloaked as religious practice to escape legal
sanction. Our decision today provides no such shield. The
Government has a compelling interest in providing an equal
opportunity to participate in the workforce without regard to
race, and prohibitions on racial discrimination are precisely
tailored to achieve that critical goal.172
Thus, if anything, Hobby Lobby supports the proposition, as discussed
below, that a context-based and effects-driven framework will strike the
166. Id. at 534, 547.
167. Id. at 533 (holding that the compelling interest must be “narrowly tailored to advance
that interest”).
168. Id. at 547. “Although the practice of animal sacrifice may seem abhorrent to some,
‘religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order
to merit First Amendment protection.’” Id. at 531 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t
Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981)).
169. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
170. Id. at 2786.
171. Id. at 2780 (stating that “[t]he most straightforward way of doing this would be for the
Government to assume the cost of providing the four contraceptives at issue to any women who
are unable to obtain them under their health-insurance policies due to their employers’ religious
objections”).
172. Id. at 2783 (citation omitted).
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proper balance between religious freedom and equal liberty for all
citizens.
Ultimately, the themes that emerge from the Court’s free exercise
jurisprudence are consistent with Justice O’Connor’s interpretation of the
free exercise clause.173 However, as evidenced in Hobby Lobby, these
broad proscriptions do not, by themselves, provide answers to the more
difficult questions that are posed when individuals, such as Kim Davis
and the Indiana bakers, refuse to issue a marriage license to gay couples
in violation of Court precedent or turn away a same-sex couple because
of moral disapproval of homosexuality. This is particularly true where
the conduct for which an individual seeking protection involves
disregarding the law and actively discriminating against third parties. In
such circumstances, the government’s interest in requiring Davis to issue
marriage licenses is unquestionably compelling.
In these situations, the Court’s jurisprudence provides little, if any,
guidance. After all, is the state substantially burdening Kim Davis’s
ability to freely exercise her religion by requiring her to issue marriage
licenses in her capacity as a state actor? Is the state impermissibly
coercing the Indiana bakers to act contrary to their religious beliefs by
prohibiting them from discriminating against individuals or groups in
their capacity as a provider of goods and services to the public?
The answer to these questions should be no, and it should be
influenced, at least in part, by the fact that protecting religious liberty in
this context would result in third parties (e.g., same-sex couples) being
denied equal protection of the law. In such cases, the Court should not,
as it has in prior cases, interpret the free exercise clause by balancing a
citizen’s interests in religious liberty against the government’s interest in
regulating its exercise. Such an ad hoc balancing has resulted in a
muddled jurisprudence that fails to properly guide lower courts,
legislatures, and citizens concerning the scope of religious liberty, and
neglects to consider the relationship, for purposes of protecting
constitutional rights, between citizens.
An effects-based framework would fill the gaps in the Court’s current
free exercise jurisprudence, recognize that all citizens should be afforded
equal dignity and protection under the law, and further the interest in
achieving collective, not merely individual, liberty. Free exercise claims
(and those under RFRA) would be analyzed not merely by evaluating the
government’s asserted interest, but by considering whether the exercise
of religion in particular contexts results in constitutional harms to other
citizens. As discussed below, in conducting this analysis, four factors
should guide the Court’s analysis: (1) the role within which the individual
seeks to exercise religious beliefs; (2) the place where the exercise of such
beliefs will occur; (3) the effects on third parties; and (4) whether the
religious practice for which an individual seeks protection is central to
their belief system (not whether the belief is objectively valid).174
173. See supra Section III.A.
174. See infra Section IV.A.
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III. CONTEXTUALIZING THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION IN A MANNER
CONSISTENT WITH ITS ORIGINAL PURPOSES AND THE COURT’S
JURISPRUDENCE
For too long, the Court has analyzed religious liberty claims by virtue
of the relationship between the religious believer and the government and
not by considering the effects of religious practices on third parties.
Without that inquiry, an individual’s free exercise of religion may
become a sword that is used to undermine liberty and equality for those
affected by its exercise (e.g., same-sex couples), rather than a shield
against “impermissible governmental interference.”175 Simply put,
protecting religious freedom for the few should not be permitted if it
compromises liberty and equality for an entire group. The importance of
linking equality to liberty in this context cannot be overstated:
A denial of liberty often contains within it the seeds of a
denial of equality. The government denies a marginalized or
disfavored group the full exercise of liberty to express a
judgment of that group’s inferiority and to prescribe the
proper roles and expected behavior of members of that
group. Likewise, a denial of equality often contains within it
the seeds of a denial of liberty. Discriminatory laws often
force the members of a marginalized or disfavored group to
forfeit their liberty to conform to majority assumptions
about their proper roles and expected conduct.176
A contextual framework that focuses not simply on the asserted
governmental interest in restricting religious liberty, but on the effects
that the exercise of religion has on other citizens would bring balance and
cohesion to free exercise jurisprudence.
In conducting this inquiry, four factors should drive the Court’s
analysis. First, regarding the individual who asserts a religious liberty
claim, courts should consider the individual’s role. Second, the Court
should consider the place within which the religious liberty claim is
asserted. Third, and as discussed above, the Court should consider the
effects of a religious liberty claim on third parties. Fourth, the Court
should examine whether the practice is, as in Yoder, integral to the
individual’s religious beliefs.177 Of course, the government’s interests
will always be relevant, but the effect of exercising religious practices on
175. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 546 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(stating that the Clause is best understood as protecting from “impermissible governmental
interference, even when such conduct conflicts with a neutral, generally applicable law”).
176. David H. Gans, The Unitary Fourteenth Amendment, 56 EMORY L.J. 907, 926–27
(2007).
177. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235 (1972) (finding that “the Amish in [that] case
[had] convincingly demonstrated . . . the vital role that belief and daily conduct play in the
continued survival of Old Order Amish communities and their religious organization”).
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third parties is the best evidence of whether those interests are
constitutionally permissible.178
A. The Four-Factor Test
In evaluating religious liberty claims under either the free exercise
clause or RFRA, the Court should consider: (1) the individual’s role; (2)
the place in which the religious liberty claim is asserted; (3) the effect the
conduct has on third parties; and (4) the centrality of the practice to that
individual’s religious belief system.
1. The Individual’s Role
The courts should consider the specific role within which an
individual seeks to exercise religious practices because it will impact the
strength of a religious liberty claim. For example, is the individual a
pastor in the Catholic Church and seeking an exemption from laws
requiring performance of same-sex marriage ceremonies, or a county
clerk who is charged with issuing marriage licenses in accordance with
the law? Is the individual seeking to exercise his or her religion in a
private church or in a public business that provides services to the public?
The difference is significant because it has a direct impact on the
targeting and coercion aspects of the Court’s free exercise determination.
If a law prohibits all businesses from discriminating on the basis of race,
ethnicity, and sexual orientation, it is highly unlikely that the law is
directly or indirectly targeting specific religions or religious practices.
Rather, the purpose of such law—to protect citizens from unequal
treatment—is not related to religious beliefs or practices, similar to the
way that time, place, and manner restrictions on speech are not related to
the content of speech. In such circumstances, it would be difficult to argue
that the government is discriminating against particular religious beliefs,
or that the interests it seeks to further are not compelling. The Court in
United States v. Lee,179 held that “[w]hen followers of a particular sect
enter into commercial activity as a matter of choice, the limits they accept
on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are not to be
superimposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on others in
that activity.”180
On the other hand, if the claimant is a pastor in a Catholic Church, the
analysis changes and the arguments for impermissible targeting are more
persuasive. In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, the law at issue,
although facially neutral, prohibited conduct that was considered a sacred
178. This is not to say that the law should never try to accommodate religious groups. To the
contrary, government should make every attempt to do so, but when the accommodation at issue
results in discrimination, unequal treatment, or other legal harms to third parties, the government’s
interest in regulating such conduct outweighs the strength of a religious liberty claim.
179. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
180. Id. at 261.
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ritual in the Santeria religion.181 Coupled with the fact that the record
underlying the law’s passage contained text that made it clear that the
Santeria religion was being targeted, the Court correctly determined that
it violated the free exercise clause.182 Put differently, the use of a facially
neutral law to target the Santeria religion offended one of the original
purposes of the free exercise clause, which was to prohibit government
from invidiously discriminating against particular religions or religious
practices.183
The individual’s role also implicates the concept of coercion.
Although a credible argument can be made that an anti-discrimination
law coerces individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs, the
alleged coercion is, at best, indirect. Moreover, the coercive aspect of
such a law applies to the individual in his or her public role as an
employee of the government,and has no effect on the individual’s right
to privately exercise her religious beliefs. Under this logic, the state may
compel Kim Davis to issue marriage licenses, but it could not compel
Davis to marry a same-sex couple in her place of worship. Perhaps most
importantly, an anti-discrimination law is an equality-enhancing function
that protects citizens from discriminatory conduct while simultaneously
not denying people of religious faith the equal protection of the law. As
the Court stated in Lyng, such a law does not “penalize religious activity
by denying any person an equal share of the rights, benefits, and
privileges enjoyed by other citizens.”184 Thus, although the coercion in
this context is indirect, the effects on other citizens (e.g., same-sex
couples) is direct in every sense.
This approach is not foreign to the Court’s broader First Amendment
jurisprudence. For example, when a plaintiff seeks damages for allegedly
false and defamatory statements, the burden of proof depends on the
status of the plaintiff. If the plaintiff is a public figure, he must
demonstrate the speaker made the statement with actual malice.185
Conversely, if the plaintiff is a private figure, the standard is lowered and
he must demonstrate that the statement was negligently made.186 The
purpose of heightening the burden of proof for public-figure plaintiffs
was to ensure that individuals could criticize public officials without
fearing that they could be hauled into court and held liable for
damages.187 In other words, the different burdens of proof are directly
181. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534, 538
(1993).
182. See id. at 534–35.
183. See id. at 542.
184. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 449 (1988).
185. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 159 (1979) (stating “public officials and
public figures who sue for defamation must prove knowing or reckless falsehood in order to
establish liability”).
186. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343, 347 (1974).
187. Id. at 348.
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related to the original purpose of the First Amendment: to facilitate a
robust marketplace of ideas.
2. The Place
The place where a religious liberty claim is asserted implicates the
same considerations as the individual’s role. If a state passed a law
outlawing the ritualistic sacrifice of animals, one could not credibly argue
that the law would offend the free exercise clause in every context. In
Lukumi Babalu Aye, for example, the ban on animal sacrifices applied
disproportionately to the Santeria religion and prohibited its members
from practicing their religion in a private place of worship.188 In this way,
the law both targeted the Santeria religion and substantially interfered
with its members’ ability to freely exercise their religious beliefs.
On the other hand, if the law in question prohibited the ritualistic
sacrifice of animals on a public street between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and
5:00 p.m., the argument for targeting would be meritless. In this situation,
the law regulates the context within which ritualistic animal sacrifice may
occur to further secular interests—public order and peace—that are
unrelated to the religious character of this practice. For this reason, the
law would not violate the free exercise clause, just as the prohibition on
cross-burning in Virginia v. Black189 did not violate the free exercise
clause because it furthered secular interests—prohibiting harassment and
intimidation—that were unrelated to the content of the speech.190
Again, this approach is not foreign to the Court’s jurisprudence. As
Justice Ginsburg recognized in Hobby Lobby, “For many individuals,
religious activity derives meaning in large measure from participation in
a larger religious community,” and “furtherance of the autonomy of
religious organizations often furthers individual religious freedom as
well.”191 Conversely, “[n]o such solicitude is traditional for commercial
organizations,” and “religious exemptions had never been extended to
any entity operating in ‘the commercial, profit-making world.’”192 The
reason for such a distinction is that “for-profit corporations . . . use labor
to make a profit, rather than to perpetuate [the] religious value[s] [shared
by a community of believers].”193 As such, the free exercise clause
“shelter[s] churches and other nonprofit religion-based organizations,”
not corporations or other public entities.194
188. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 535.
189. 538 U.S. 342 (2003).
190. See id. at 344.
191. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2794 (2014) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 342 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
192. Id. at 2795 (quoting Amos, 483 U.S. at 337).
193. Id. at 2796–97 (alterations in original) (quoting Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 733 F.3d 1208, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 2013)).
194. Id. at 2794. Justice Ginsburg further stated:
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By way of analogy, in the Fourth Amendment context, the Court has
afforded citizens varying degrees of privacy protections—and shifted law
enforcement’s evidentiary burden—based on the place in which an
alleged Fourth Amendment violation occurs. Privacy rights receive the
highest level of protection in the home, where law enforcement is
required to have probable cause and a warrant before conducting a
search.195 When citizens travel in automobiles, however, their privacy
protections are diminished, and law enforcement need only possess
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to detain a motorist.196 Finally,
when citizens walk on a public street or place objects in an open field,
they have no expectation of privacy and law enforcement may observe
them without justification.197 As with outlawing animal sacrifice on a
public street, the relationship between the strength of citizens’ privacy
rights and their location is based on the governmental and societal interest
in protecting public safety.
3. The Effects on Third Parties
In the free speech context, when considering the validity of
regulations that impact free speech rights, the Court has upheld
legislation restricting speech because of its deleterious secondary effects.
The Court should adopt the same approach in free exercise cases because,
in limited circumstances, community values outweigh individual values.
In Hobby Lobby, the Court acknowledged that it “must take adequate
account of the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on
nonbeneficiaries.”198 The “effects” prong fundamentally alters the
relational aspect of the free exercise and RFRA inquiries. Rather than
simply focusing on the relationship between the individual and
government, this prong requires the Court to consider the relationship
between citizens and to evaluate whether the exercise of an individual’s
religious liberty denies other individuals “an equal share of the rights,
benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens.”199 In conducting this

Religious organizations exist to foster the interests of persons subscribing to the
same religious faith. Not so of for-profit corporations. Workers who sustain the
operations of those corporations commonly are not drawn from one religious
community. Indeed, by law, no religion-based criterion can restrict the work
force of for-profit corporations. The distinction between a community made up
of believers in the same religion and one embracing persons of diverse beliefs,
clear as it is, constantly escapes the Court’s attention. One can only wonder why
the Court shuts this key difference from sight.
Id. at 2795–96 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
195. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987).
196. See Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014).
197. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984).
198. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781 n.37 (emphasis added) (quoting Cutter v.
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005)).
199. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 449 (1988).
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inquiry, the Court should focus on whether the conduct for which a
citizen seeks constitutional protection (e.g., the right to refuse to issue
marriage licenses to same-sex couples), if engaged in by the government,
would have the effect of violating other citizens’ legal and constitutional
rights.
Perhaps most importantly, an effects-driven inquiry would ensure that
the free exercise of religion does not subject other citizens to
discrimination on the basis of, among other things, race and ethnicity. In
Hobby Lobby, Justice Ginsburg stated:
Would the exemption the Court holds RFRA demands for
employers with religiously grounded objections to the use of
certain contraceptives extend to employers with religiously
grounded objections to blood transfusions (Jehovah’s
Witnesses); antidepressants (Scientologists); medications
derived from pigs, including anesthesia, intravenous fluids,
and pills coated with gelatin (certain Muslims, Jews, and
Hindus); and vaccinations (Christian Scientists, among
others)? According to counsel for Hobby Lobby, “each one
of these cases . . . would have to be evaluated on its
own . . . apply[ing] the compelling interest-least restrictive
alternative test.” Not much help there for the lower courts
bound by today’s decision.200
Thus, defining the scope of religious liberty in part based on its thirdparty effects would avoid these problems, promote equality under the
law, and further a collective view of liberty. Justice Ginsburg endorsed
this approach in Hobby Lobby, stating that “[n]o tradition, and no prior
decision under RFRA, allows a religion-based exemption when the
accommodation would be harmful to others.”201 It would also enable the
Court to identify circumstances in which citizens are merely expressing
moral disapproval of a particular group rather than exercising a religious
belief.202 If the government cannot enact laws driven by moral
disapproval of a group of citizens, as the Court held in Lawrence, then in
some situations, citizens should not be permitted to base religious
freedom claims on that same disapproval. As the Court held in Prince v.
Massachusetts,203
the
“limitations
[that]
bound
religious
freedom . . . begin to operate whenever activities begin to affect or collide
with liberties of others or of the public.”204
200. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2805 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (citation
omitted) (Justice Ginsburg also noted that “approving some religious claims while deeming others
unworthy of accommodation could be ‘perceived as favoring one religion over another,’ the very
‘risk the Establishment Clause was designed to preclude.’” (quoting United States v. Lee, 455
U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1996))).
201. Id. at 2801.
202. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
203. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
204. Id. at 177.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol69/iss3/1

36

Lamparello: Contextualizing the Free Exercise of Religion

2017]

CONTEXTUALIZING THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION

717

Of course, religious liberty proponents would likely argue that they
are not infringing on the rights of any citizen but merely seeking a
religious accommodation for their deeply held beliefs. Even if the free
exercise clause’s original purposes supported this argument, the Court
should not embrace it as a normative matter. If the Court protected
religious freedom regardless of the fact that an individual was acting in a
public role, in a capacity as a public official, and in a manner that would
cause constitutional harm to third parties, religious accommodations
would become a prescription for inequality of a very undemocratic kind.
In other contexts, the analysis would likely differ. As discussed above,
in Hobby Lobby, the Court accommodated the religious beliefs of a
closely held corporation primarily because the government had less
intrusive means by which to achieve its objective (contraception coverage
for female employees).205 However, even if the Court had ruled that the
government must make an exception for closely held corporations in all
cases, it would be consistent with an effect-based approach to free
exercise claims. Specifically, unlike Davis, who would have deprived
same-sex couples of their fundamental right to marriage, the closely held
corporation will not deprive female employees of a constitutional right or
protection. Although it will likely be an inconvenience to some
employees to purchase contraception from a store or through a physician,
those individuals are not the victims of unlawful discrimination nor are
they being denied equal protection of the law. Simply put, the effects
prong is not intended to prohibit the free exercise of religion in all cases
and contexts but merely to strike a better balance in favor of citizens’
collective constitutional rights.
4. Whether the Practice Is a Central Component of an Individual’s
Religious Beliefs
The final prong of this test involves a careful inquiry into whether a
religious liberty claim involves practices that are central to the
individual’s religious beliefs. To be clear, this does not—and cannot—
permit the Court to assess the validity of a particular religion or, in
violation of Ballard, the sincerity of an individual’s beliefs. Such a
subjective inquiry would place the Court in a position to implicitly value
certain religious beliefs over others, in violation of the Establishment
Clause.206 Instead, under this prong the Court would evaluate the
objective reasonableness of an individual’s free exercise claim by
examining the centrality of particular conduct to a religious belief.
Including an objective reasonableness inquiry in the free exercise
context is consistent with the Court’s precedent. For example, the Court
has stated that “[t]he free exercise inquiry asks whether government has
205. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780–81.
206. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion . . . .”).
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placed a substantial burden on the observation of a central
religious belief or practice and, if so, whether a compelling governmental
interest justifies the burden.”207 By way of analogy, in the Fourth
Amendment context, the Court protects an individual’s privacy rights
only if they are objectively reasonable.208 In fact, in Yoder, the Court
emphasized the objective reasonableness of the Amish parents’ free
exercise claim:
[T]he impact of the compulsory-attendance law [is not]
confined to grave interference with important Amish
religious tenets from a subjective point of view. It carries
with it precisely the kind of objective danger to the free
exercise of religion that the First Amendment was designed
to prevent. As the record shows, compulsory school
attendance to age 16 for Amish children carries with it a very
real threat of undermining the Amish community and
religious practice as they exist today; they must either
abandon belief and be assimilated into society at large, or be
forced to migrate to some other and more tolerant region.209
This approach makes eminent sense. After all, it is one thing to allow
Amish families to educate their children in accordance with their basic
religious values, but it is quite another to allow individuals to refuse to
issue marriage licenses or bake wedding cakes in violation of the law, and
at the expense of other citizens’ constitutional protections. Unlike in
Yoder, where the Amish asserted a religious liberty claim that was “not
simply a matter of theocratic belief,” but rather one that “pervades
and determines virtually their entire way of life,”210 refusing to issue
207. Hernandez v. C.I.R., 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (emphasis added).
208. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (“The Amendment does not protect
the merely subjective expectation of privacy, but only those ‘expectation[s] that society is
prepared to recognize as “reasonable.”’” (alteration in original) (quoting Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967))).
209. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972) (emphasis added).
210. Id. at 216. The Court stated as follows:
[T]he record in this case abundantly supports the claim that the traditional way
of life of the Amish is not merely a matter of personal preference, but one of deep
religious conviction, shared by an organized group, and intimately related to
daily living. That the Old Order Amish daily life and religious practice stem from
their faith is shown by the fact that it is in response to their literal interpretation
of the Biblical injunction from the Epistle of Paul to the Romans, ‘be not
conformed to this world . . . .’ This command is fundamental to the Amish faith.
Moreover, for the Old Order Amish, religion is not simply a matter of theocratic
belief. As the expert witnesses explained, the Old Order Amish religion pervades
and determines virtually their entire way of life, regulating it with the detail of
the Talmudic diet through the strictly enforced rules of the church community.
Id.
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marriage licenses or bake a cake for a same-sex couple has no direct
impact on an individual’s ability to freely practice his religious beliefs.
Furthermore, the Amish family’s claim in Yoder did not result in unlawful
discrimination against other citizens or unequal treatment under the
law.211 In short, the Amish family’s right to freely exercise their religion
was objectively reasonable. And reasonableness, not a categorical
accommodation for religious liberty claims, would produce “a coherent
scheme of equal basic liberties, or fair terms of social cooperation on the
basis of mutual respect and trust, for our constitutional democracy.”212
After all, it is “the entitlement of each constituent to have his or her
interest taken into account, on equal footing with those of all others.”213
B. Ensuring Consistency with the Original Purpose of the Free
Exercise Clause and the Court’s Jurisprudence
A context-centered framework is consistent with the original purposes
of the free exercise clause and the Court’s jurisprudence and harmonizes
the right to freely practice one’s religion with citizens’ competing right
to equal protection of the law.
1. The Original Purpose of the Free Exercise Clause
The historical record, particularly at the time the free exercise clause
was drafted, demonstrates that the drafters intended to prohibit the
government from “unnecessarily hinder[ing] believers from freely
practicing their religion.”214 In other words, the clause proscribes
“impermissible governmental interference, even when such conduct
conflicts with a neutral, generally applicable law.”215 Thus, Justice
O’Connor was correct, and Smith was wrongly decided.
However, this does not end the constitutional inquiry. Before the free
exercise clause was drafted, Thomas Jefferson wrote that the government
could restrict religious liberty to preserve “peace and good order.”216 In
addition, the Court has repeatedly acknowledged that the states may
lawfully regulate religious practices to “safeguard the peace, good order
and comfort of the community, without unconstitutionally invading the
liberties protected by the Fourteenth [or First] Amendment.”217 Tellingly,
the Court has employed nearly identical language in its free speech cases,

211.
212.
(1993).
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

See id. at 224.
James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 TEX. L. REV. 211, 290
Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty, the New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1558 (2002).
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 549 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 546.
Id. at 562.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940).
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holding that an individual’s free speech right may be restricted when it is
“outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”218
This language suggests that neither the drafters nor the Court view the
free exercise clause as requiring the states to categorically accommodate
religious liberty claims and therefore exempt citizens from generally
applicable laws. The Court’s narrowly crafted decision in Hobby Lobby,
particularly the passage intimating that religious liberty claims could
never be used to sanction racial (and likely other) forms of discrimination,
supports this conclusion.219 By considering factors such as an
individual’s role, the place of religious exercise, the effect on third
parties, and the centrality of a religious claim to the core religious beliefs,
the Court would ensure the “peace, good order and comfort of the
community”220 by protecting all citizens from invidious discrimination
and unequal protection of the laws. In doing so, the Court would also
safeguard the free exercise of religion from arbitrary laws that seek to
accomplish precisely what the free exercise clause forbids: targeting
specific religious beliefs and practices, discriminating against particular
religions, and coercing individuals to act contrary to core religious
beliefs. Put simply, this test would promote social order through equal
liberty while simultaneously prohibiting impermissible governmental
interference through laws that, by design or effect, substantially burden
the free exercise of religion.
2. The Court’s Jurisprudence
The proposed standard in this framework is consistent with the
Court’s pre- and post-Smith jurisprudence, and would provide adequate
guidance to lower courts and lawmakers in future cases. In Sherbert, the
law at issue penalized an employee for adhering to a religiously mandated
day of rest, even though it had no effect on third parties and was central
to the employee’s religious beliefs.221 In Yoder, the state compelled
Amish children to attend public schools in violation of their religious
beliefs, even though these beliefs were exercised in a private role and
place, had no effect on third parties, and were central to the Amish belief
system.222 Similarly, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, the law
prohibiting animal slaughter, albeit well-intentioned, directly targeted the
Santeria faith and impermissibly interfered with a religious practice in a
private place of worship.223 The proposed standard in this Article would
lead to the same results—with one exception. If this standard were
applied to the facts in Smith, the result would have been different. The
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
(1993).

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2783 (2014).
Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 304 (emphasis added).
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409–10 (1963).
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972).
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534, 546–47
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law in Smith, although generally applicable, enabled precisely the type of
governmental interference with religion that the Court invalidated in
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye: interference with ceremonial religious
practices at private places of worship.
Furthermore, this standard not only fits well with the Court’s prior
jurisprudence, it also gives the Court a path by which to specifically
define what it means to “substantially burden[] a person’s exercise of
religion”224 under RFRA and thus facilitates the development of
workable rules to apply in future cases. Currently, it is difficult to identify
with precision laws that would substantially burden religion, which
invariably necessitates the ad hoc, case-by-case approach that is
characteristic of the Court’s pre- and post-Smith jurisprudence. By
defining this phrase with clarity and specificity, the Court can import
predictability, fairness, and balance into the free exercise—and public—
arena.
CONCLUSION
The Court should evaluate religious liberty claims with the
understanding that “it is only in an egalitarian society that full and
extensive liberty is possible.”225 At bottom, the free exercise of religion
is an expression of liberty itself, and it would be quite ironic if the
protections for religious liberty resulted in a constitutional hierarchy of
values that undermined the very egalitarianism upon which liberty is
predicated. Evaluating religious liberty claims through the proposed
framework in this Article yields no less protection for religious freedom
than the Founders envisaged but no more protection than is needed to
ensure that religious liberty is exercised in a manner consistent with equal
protection of the law. Although this does not mean that “freedom or
equality must be somehow traded off against itself,”226 it does require an
appreciation that a “constitutional democracy cannot allow for a graded
hierarchy of the basic dignity of persons.”227 And dignity, not
discrimination, is the foundation of a liberty-based constitutional
democracy. After all, if citizens dare to claim that they are acting under
“God’s authority,” those who will most likely benefit from God’s good
graces should embrace dignity over discrimination and equality over
ecclesiasticism.

224. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2761.
225. KAI NIELSEN, EQUALITY AND LIBERTY 302 (1985).
226. R. George Wright, Dignity and Conflicts of Constitutional Values: The Case of Free
Speech and Equal Protection, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 527, 560 (2006).
227. Id. at 557.
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